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INSURANCE-RECOVERY-DELAY OF INSURANCE COMPANY IN REJECTING
APPLICATION FOR INSURANCE-Plaintiff, designated as beneficiary by deceased
life insurance applicant, sued defendant life insurance company in assumpsit. Deceased, a combat pilot in the Korean War, had applied for
one of defendant's policies, passed the medical examination, and made
several premium payments on the policy. After the applicant was killed in
combat defendant refused payment, contending that it had never accepted
the risk but that it had responded to the application with a counter offer
containing an aviation waiver. Because of ·the applicant's frequent change
of address and his early death this proposal had never been communicated to him. On appeal from the lower court's directed verdict for defendant, held, judgment vacated and case remanded for new trial. The
evidence was sufficient to send to the jury the question whether a contract of insurance had resulted prior to applicant's death. 1 Wadsworth v.
New York Life Insurance Company, 349 Mich. 240, 84 N.W. (2d) 513 (1957).
The subject of delay on the part of an insurance company in handling
an insurance application has caused much comment in the law reviews.2
Since an application for insurance would seem to be no more than an
offer,3 finding the delaying insurance company bound would appear to be in·

1 Since there was evidence which might have warranted the inference that an actual
contract had resulted prior to applicant's death it is unlikely that many courts would
have reached a different holding on these facts. However, for the purpose of guiding the
retrial of the case, the court commented on the consequences of delay in rejecting an
application for insurance. In extended dictum the court accepted the "contract theory,''
imposing a contract as a matter of law when an insurance company fails to reject an
application for insurance within a reasonable time. It thus follows the views of a very
small minority of jurisdictions. See 32 A.L.R. (2d) 487 (1953).
2 Prosser, "Delay in Acting on an Application for Insurance," 3 UNIV. .Cm. L. REv. 39
(1935); Funk, "The .Duty of an Insurer To Act Promptly on Applications," 75 UNIV. PA.
L. REv. 207 (1927); notes and comments, 11 Bosr. UNIV. L. REv. 230 (1931); 48 DICK. L.
REv. 51 (1943); 1955 INS. L. J. 441; 20 IOWA L. REV. 165 (1934); 23 MARQ. L. REv. 28 (1938);
32 MICH. L. REv. 395 (1934).
3 Hayes v. Durham Life Ins. Co., 198 Va. 67~, 96 S.E. (2d) 109 (1957).
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conflict with traditional contract law. 4 Thus, most courts which have held
the insurance company liable5 have employed the so-called tort theory, 6
under which the delay in acting upon the insurance application is considered actionable negligence. Although a finding of duty is prerequisite to a
holding of negligence, 7 courts have had difficulty in discovering a duty of
the insurance company to reject applications promptly. Some courts have
found a duty arising out of the retention of premiums by the insurance company.8 Others have found the duty simply by referring to the peculiar nature of the insurance business and the possibility of irretrievable loss to the
individual.9 Use has been made of the general tort principle that one who
undertakes a course of action for another is liable for negligence in that action.10 In cases where the delay is caused by the insurance agent acting in the
scope of his authority, his negligence may be charged to his principal.11 A
few courts hold that the state's grant of a franchise to the insurance company obligates the company to provide speedy and efficient insurance service to the public.12 Aside from the problem of finding a duty, the tort theory
involves several other difficulties. The problem of proximate cause has
proved to be an insurmountable obstacle for some courts, 13 while others approach it with the traditional "but for" test, arguing that the damage to the
applicant was caused by his having been prevented from obtaining insurance elsewhere while he could still have done so. 14 Since the duty, if one
exists, would seem to be to the applicant, most courts consider the tort as
committed against the applicant; 15 consequently it has been questioned
whether the applicant is actually damaged by the lack of insurance at the
time of his death, since he never was to receive any of the proceeds of the
policy.16 Also the argument that no cause of action accrued to the applicant

4 Swentusky v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 116 Conn. 526, 165 A. 686 (1933).
5 It must be realized that there is substantial authority disallowing any recovery
in cases of this nature. See 32 A.L.R. (2d) 487 (1953).
6 See 32 A.L.'R. (2d) 487 (1953).
7 Burks v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., (D.C. Ga. 1951) 98 F. Supp. 140, affd.
(5th Cir. 1951) 192 F. (2d) 643, cert. den. 343 U.S. 915 (1952).
8 DeFord v. New York Life Ins. Co., 75 Colo. 146, 224 P. 1049 (1924). But see Hayes
v. Durham Life Ins. Co., note 3 supra.
o Coffey v. Polimeni, (9th Cir. 1951) 188 F. (2d) 539.
10 See concurring opinion in Wallace v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 31 Idaho 481, 174
P. 1009 (1918).
11 Stark v. Pioneer Casualty Co., 139 Cal. App. 577, 34 P. (2d) 731 (1934), noted in
23 CALIF. L. REv. 215 (1934).
12Security Ins. Co. of New Haven, Conn. v. Cameron, 85 Okla. 171, 205 P. 151 (1922).
See 27 HARv. L. REv. 92 (1913).
13 It is often held that the damage is proximately caused by the happening of the
contingency rather than by the inaction of the insurance company. See Munger v.
Equitable Life Assur. Soc., (D.C. Mo. 1933) 2 F. Supp. 914.
14 Wyble v. Preferred Life Assur. Soc., (La. App. 1955) 83 S. (2d) 785.
15Smith v. Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Co., 86 Cal. App. (2d) 581, 195 P. (2d) 457 (1948);
Burks v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., note 7 supra.
16 Thornton v. Order of Mechanics, 110 W. Va. 412, 158 S.E. 507 (1931).
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during his life is not without some force.17 From the point of view of
incidence of damage it would appear only reasonable to consider the
tort as one committed against the intended beneficiary; 18 however, it is
very difficult to find a duty to the beneficiary. The measure of damages
has generally been the face amount of the policy applied for, 19 rather than
the premiums paid. Some courts have found contributory negligence of the
applicant in his failure to make an inquiry or to procure insurance elsewhere after a reasonable time has elapsed.20 A very small group of cases
allows recovery on a contract theory.21 Under this approach, which is
favored by the principal case in extended dictum, silence of the insurance
company over an unreasonable period of time is held to amount to an
implied acceptance, binding the company to the contract applied for.22
Most courts, however, reject this view as being in conflict with established
principles of contract law,23 for normally after the expiration of a reasonable period of time an offeror should consider his offer rejected rather
than accepted.24 The contract theory has the advantage of providing
logical certainty as to the measure of damages and the identity of the
person damaged and entitled to recovery; 25 therefore, at least in these
respects, it would appear to be preferable to the tort theory of recovery. The cases have not favored estoppel arguments.26 Courts have
questioned whether an applicant can reasonably consider the retention
of his application equivalent to an acceptance of it, 27 and have doubted
that his failure to seek insurance elsewhere was induced by the insurance
company. 28 Many cases are complicated by additional factors. It appears to
be the general practice of insurance companies to issue a "binder"29 at

17 See Bradley v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 295 Ill. 381, 129 N.E. 191 (1920).
18 See Bekken v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 70 N.D. 122, 293 N.W. 200 (1940).
19 While this would appear to be a contract measure of damages, courts have held
that the loss suffered was the value of the policy applied for. Mann v. Policyholders' Nat.
Life Ins. Co., 78 N.D. 724, 51 N.W. (2d) 853 (1952).
20 Wyble v. Preferred Life Assur. Soc., note 14 supra.
21 See 32 A.L.R. (2d) 487 (1953). It has also ,been suggested that there is an implied
contract to decide promptly whether to accept or reject ,the risk. See Travellers Insurance
Co. v. Taliaferro, 176 Okla. 242, 54 P. (2d) 1069 (1935).
22 See Harvey v. United Ins. Co., 173 Kan. 227, 245 P. (2d) 1185 (1952).
23 Compare Hayes v. Durham Life Ins. Co., note 3 supra, with 1 CONTRACTS REsTATEMENT §72 (1932), where silence is :held to ·be an acceptance when accompanied by acts
of dominion over things offered to the offeree.
24,More v. N.Y. Bowery Fire Ins. Co., 130 N.Y. 537, 29 N.E. 757 (1892).
25 The measure of damages would clearly be the face amount of -the policy. Also, this
view would allow recovery ,by the intended beneficiary rather than by the estate of the
deceased applicant.
26 Paulk v. State ,Mut. Life Ins. Co., 85 Ga. App. 413, 69 S.E. (2d) 777 (1952).
27 See Reed v. Prudential Ins. Co., 229 Mo. App. 90, 73 S.W. (2d) 1027 (1934).
28Zielinski v. General American Life J:ns. Co., (Mo. App. 1936) 96 S.W. (2d) 1059.
29 "The memorandum of an agreement for insurance intended to give temporary
protection pending investigation of the risk and issuance of a formal policy." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY, 4th ed., p. 213 (1951).
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the time of application when the premium is paid in advance.80 The
argument that such binders create -temporary contracts of insurance has
been made with a degree of success31 which varies with the court and the
wording of the binding receipt. Another misleading practice is the customary requirement that renewal premiums must be paid on the anniversary of the date of application rather than of the date of final acceptance.82 Thus it would seem that an insurance company could help to
avoid liability in some of these cases by being as precise as possible in its
dealings with applicants. Public policy, of course, is a vital factor in these
cases. Arguments can be made on both sides of the controversy.33 While
the public interest in the prompt availability of insurance should not be
underestimated, the interest in maintaining low insurance rates is perhaps
as great.34 The attempts to apply inapplicable· existing doctrine to these
cases frequently can be considered judicial legislation; 35 and in view of the
persistence of the problem, it would seem to be desirable for the legislatures to act in this field.
Harry D. Krause, S.Ed.

so See comments, 44 YALE L. J. 1223 (1935); 63 YALE L. J. 523 (1954).
81 See Rabb v. Public Nat. Ins. Co., (6th Cir. 1957) 243 F. (2d) 940; Killpack v.
National Old Line Ins. Co., (10th Cir. 1956) 229 F. (2d) 851. See also 107 A.L.R. 194
(1937); 60 HARv. L. REv. 1164 (1947).
82 It is generally held, however, that receipt of premiums does not abrogate the
necessity for acceptance and issuance of a policy. See Reese v. American Nat. Ins. Co.,
(5th Cir. 1949) 175 F. (2d) 793. Nor is the circumstance that the offer was solicited by
the insurance company regarded as relevant. See Patten v. Continental Cas. Co., 162
Ohio St. 18, 120 N.E. (2d) 441 (1954).
33 It must be remembered that in the usual case a widow or orphans appear as
plaintiffs.
34 It is apparent that the other policy holders are paying for each recovery in cases
of this nature, either by higher future rates or by having less funds available to secure
their policies.
85 See Savage v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of America, 154 Miss. 89, 121 S. 487 (1929).

